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It is our pleasure to introduce the first issue of Phenomenology and Mind – The 
online Journal of the Center in Phenomenology and Sciences of the Person. This first 
issue is devoted to the proceedings of the Winter School The Phenomenological 
Mind (January 26-28, 2010) organized by the Research Center in Phenomenology 
and Sciences of the Person at the Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele and by the 
Phenomenology Lab (www.phenomenoloylab.eu) with the collaboration of the 
Università degli Studi di Milano.
As everybody knows, The Phenomenological Mind is also the title of the book by 
Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (Routledge, London 2008; Italian translation by 
Patrizia Pedrini, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano 2009). The Winter School The 
Phenomenological Mind aimed to discuss the main topics of The phenomenological 
Mind: first of all the phenomenological perspective on Mind, Cognitive and 
Neurosciences, including the relation between phenomenology and analytic 
philosophy, and secondly, some crucial themes like Action and Agency, Social 
Cognition and Consciousness, Pathology of the self perception.
We would like to thank the Scientific Board which reviewed the submitted 
papers: Clotilde Calabi (Università degli Studi di Milano), Roberto Mordacci 
(Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele), Massimo Reichlin (Università Vita-Salute 
San Raffaele), Elisabetta Sacchi (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele), Roberta 
Sala (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele), Corrado Sinigaglia (Università degli 
Studi di Milano).
We would like to thank also the invited speakers and invited contributors who 
have sent their papers for the publication in the present issue: Vittorio Gallese, 
Shaun Gallagher, Lynne Baker, Elisabetta Sacchi.
The issue collects nineteen papers about three topics:
(i) Phenomenology, neuroscience and analytic philosophy;
(ii) Action and Agency;
(iii) Social Cognition and Consciousness.
The first section of the volume collects the invited speakers’ papers (Vittorio 
Gallese and Shaun Gallagher) and further invited contributions (Lynne Baker 
and Elisabetta Sacchi) as well as two papers by the editors of the volume 
(Roberta De Monticelli and Francesca De Vecchi). The focus of this session is 
the relation among phenomenology, neuroscience and analytic philosophy. 
1. 
The Winter 
School  “The 
Phenomenological 
Mind”
2. 
The structure 
of the volume
We should phenomenologize cognitive neuroscience 
rather than naturalizing phenomenology1. 
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2 Gallese (2006, p. 294).
The main topics the section deals with are: neurophenomenology; first-person 
vs. third-person perspective; embodied simulation; social cognition, collective 
intentionality and social ontology; phenomenal modes of presentation.
The second section of the volume gathers the selected papers investigating the 
topic “Action and Agency” together (Luca Casartelli, Donald O’Conaill, Beril 
Sözmen Idemen, Philip Tonner, Lodovica Maria Zanet, Silvano Zipoli Caiani). 
The papers of this section deal with such questions as: what is an action? What 
is the sense of agency for our actions? Which is the relation between agency 
and awareness? These questions are crucial to phenomenology, according to 
which actions, practical concerns and practical reason drive our everyday life 
much more than theoretical wondering and thinking.
The third section of the volume collects the selected papers concerning 
the topic “Social Cognition and Consciousness” (Anna Bortolan, Emanuele 
Caminada, Marco Fenici, Gloria Galloni, Marco Tedeschini, Nicola Zippel, 
Beatrice Kobow). In philosophical, cognitive and neuroscientific debate “social 
cognition” and “consciousness” are said in many meanings. Starting both from 
phenomenological, neurobiological and cognitive data, the contributions of 
this section argue out several crucial aspects of  “consciousness” – affective, 
cognitive and linguistic – and “social cognition” – empathic feeling, higher 
order persons, intersubjective intentionality.
We would like now to focus on the Leit Motiv of the first issue of Phenomenology 
and Mind which also characterises, even if in different ways, the contributions 
of Vittorio Gallese, Lynne Baker and Shaun Gallagher.
“We should phenomenologize cognitive neuroscience rather than naturalizing 
phenomenology”2. Let us adopt this often quoted statement as a maxim for 
what proved to be a hard endeavour: editing this first issue of Phenomenology 
and Mind, the online journal of the Research Center for Phenomenology and 
Sciences of the Person. Let us choose it as something more substantial and at 
the same time less solemn than a maxim or a motto: a word of moral support, 
so to speak, coming from a researcher and a scientist among the very few who 
are presently well known all over the world – and particularly well known 
to philosophers. Its author, as many remember, is Vittorio Gallese, whom we 
thank again both for having been among the protagonists of 2010 Università 
Vita-Salute San Raffaele Winter School “The Phenomenological Mind”, and 
for enduring urgings and postponements, in order that his text could be ready 
for publication in this issue. Two other main contributions will be specially, 
even though too cursorily, addressed in this short presentation. This choice 
has been done to make a virtue of necessity, in a way: that is, to express our 
3.
 Phenomenology 
and cognitive 
neurosciences
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3 Gallese (2011).
special thanks to their authors, who, for different reasons, were not present at 
the Winter School but accepted to send their papers for our journal, in spite of 
its virtuality. Sending a paper to a journal which is virtual, not just in the sense 
of being essentially an online journal, but in the more embarrassing sense of 
not being born yet – this is an act of true generosity, for which we would like to 
express deep appreciation. 
But there is a deeper, more theoretic reason to confine the more explicit part 
of this introduction within the triangle of three main contributions – namely 
Lynne Baker’s and Shaun Gallagher’s, beside the already quoted one by 
Vittorio Gallese. This, we hope, will be made clearer by the remainder of this 
introduction, which is so partial for a third and last reason too: that the very 
research project animating our Center and its ventures, as well as – we hope – 
this journal, is outlined in De Monticelli’s own contribution to this issue, along 
with a piece of history of European and Italian phenomenology – that piece 
which our Center more directly stems from, and hopes to carry on.
Vittorio Gallese gives two good reasons supporting the attempt of 
phenomenologizing neuroscience. Since we all agree on one of them – namely 
that a dialogue and an attempt to translate the different notions employed by 
both disciplines, neuroscience and phenomenology, is just necessary – let us 
focus on the other one: 
Why should we try to phenomenologize Neuroscience? Because if one of the aims of 
Cognitive Neuroscience is to shed light on the human condition, we certainly cannot but 
start from how the world is constituted within our own phenomenal appreciation 3.
We cannot but start from the phenomenal world, or the life-world, in the strict 
sense of the world which is each time given within the horizon of any given 
subject of consciousness or experience, namely any person. This is formally 
the horizon of a first person perspective – more specifically the noematic 
or objective pole of it, its noetic or subjective pole being the origin of such a 
perspective. Now, the concept of first person perspective is the subject of both 
Baker’s and Gallagher’s papers. What we found striking is the measure in which 
the results of Baker’s and of Gallagher’s independent analyses converge. As if 
getting closer to truth did diminish the distance between Pragmatic Realism 
and Experimental Phenomenology – as this convergence was not looked for, 
nor was it to foresee, in advance. 
In order to argue for this convergence thesis, we shall start from a Husserlian 
text, a not so quoted one, which we find particularly inspiring as it links 
consciousness and normativity – a concept which both Baker and Gallagher use 
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(the former quite explicitly, the latter at least implicitly) to refute reduction of 
(phenomenal) consciousness to sheer subjectivity.
Normativity is an essential feature of intentionality, though a very neglected 
one both in continental and analytic philosophy of mind: yet it pervades the 
whole extent of our mental life. This is a deep insight phenomenology offers, 
suggesting that we should look at personhood as the condition of what we may 
call “the normative animal”. A description of what we mean by “normative 
animal” can be found in this remarkable passage by Edmund Husserl: 
Animals live by sheer instinct, humans are also subject to norms. All kinds of conscious 
states are crossed by and interwoven with a normative consciousness of right and 
wrong (appropriate, inappropriate, handsome, ugly, suited, unsuited and so on), which 
motivates corresponding competent actions, with effects on reality and social reality, on 
the basis of knowledge and evaluation 4.
Consciousness and normativity are essentially bound in our life. For, according to this 
description, we do not first perceive, feel or act and only later learn to perceive, feel or 
act adequately; we are subject to normativity from the very beginning. We experience 
the world in such a way as to be at least able to learn from our errors, to correct them. 
We are bound to be reasonable from the very outset of our life. How is that possible? 
Husserl’s answer to this question sheds light on many peculiarities which distinguish 
our very early dispositions to social cognition from those of other primates, as 
described in the pioneering work of Michael Tomasello5, quoted by Baker and surely 
known to Gallagher6. We shall not go into details here, but one more quotation might 
be useful: it will help us to recall that central achievement of Husserl’s which is his 
unified theory of reason (theoretic, axiological, practical), as the realm of acts subject to 
normativity, or the distinction right/wrong. Here is a passage nicely summarizing 
that achievement:
Let me notice for the sake of clarity that the word “reason” is not understood here as 
meaning a human psychological disposition, but as a general term for the essentially 
closed class of acts and corresponding objects, that fall under the ideas of right and wrong, 
PHENOMENOLOGIZING COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE?
4 Das Tier lebt unter bloßen Instinkten, der Mensch auch unter Normen. Durch alle Arten von 
Bewußtseinsakten geht ein damit verflochtenes normatives Bewußtsein von richtig und unrichtig 
(schicklich, unschicklich, schön, häßlich, zweckmäßig, unzweckmäßig usw.) und motiviert ein 
entsprechendes erkennendes, wertendes, dinglich und gesellschaftlich wirkendes Handeln. Husserl, 
Fünf Aufsätze über Erneuerung. Formale Typen der Kultur in der Menschheitsentwicklung, in 
Husserl (1922-1937, p. 59).
5 Tomasello (1999), The cultural Origins of Human Cognition, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts; (2008) Origins of Human Communication, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; (2009) Why we cooperate, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
6 Tomasello (1999) belongs to the References of Gallagher-Zahavi (2008).
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respectively of true and false, being there or not being there etc. As many basic kinds of acts 
subject to these ideas can be distinguished, so many kinds of reason there are 7.
Going back to our main invited contributions: both Baker and Gallagher focus 
on first person perspective, respectively as a mode of (self)consciousness 
essentially characterizing persons as such, and as a mode of (self)consciousness 
irreducible to third person perspective, or “neutral”, “objective” reports of 
a subject sayings and behaviours. Both authors, we said, make explicitly or 
implicitly use of a concept of normativity to prove their theses. Let’s see.
Baker’s argument rejects a Cartesian foundation of first person perspective. 
Descartes was right about the importance of the first person perspective 
point of view. He was wrong in claiming that such a perspective required a 
separate, substantial mind or self as its subject, being both independent of 
other selves and opposed to the material world, understood as, in its turn, 
mind-independent. A phenomenologist can but agree with both sides of the 
thesis: disembodied solitary selves are impossible, and the ordinary world – the 
world of encounters, or the life-world – is not mind independent. Now what 
is extremely interesting is Baker’s argument for the “social” part of the first 
thesis, needed as a premise to support the second as well. A (robust) first person 
perspective, which, Baker argues, is already enjoyed by a very young child able 
to claim ownership of “her” toys, could not possibly be there in case the child 
were the only inhabitant of earth, since the ability to refer to oneself as oneself, 
“from inside” so to speak, requires an ability in discriminating objects (toys 
and fragile vases, “mine” and “not mine”) which cannot be acquired without a 
public language. The reason is that a public language is – in a wittgensteinian 
mood – the source of normativity. The child “has to stand to be corrected” 
in order to acquire the empirical concepts of, say, “toy” and “vase”. For, if 
whatever seems right to her is right, “that only means that here we cannot 
talk about ‘right’”. But to stand to be corrected is to have social and linguistic 
relations. So, Descartes solipsism is “a fantasy”. That means, the very oblivion 
of a precondition of his thinking: he can think himself as disembodied, but if 
this thought were true, he could not have articulated it. 
While agreeing with Baker on her main lines of argument, a phenomenologist 
would resist a wittgensteinian tendency to see language as the only origin of 
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eines menschlichen Seelenvermögens, sondern einen Titel für die wesensmässig 
geschlossene Klasse von Akten und ihre zugehörigen Aktkorrelaten befasst, die unter 
Ideen der Rechtmässigkeit und Unrechtmässigkeit, korrelativ der Wahrheit und 
Falschheit, des Bestehens und Nichtbestehens usw. stehen. Soviel Grundarten von 
Akten wir scheiden können, für welche dies gilt, soviel Grundarten der Vernunft” 
(Husserl, 1908-1914, p. 68).
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normativity. That is the reason why comparison with Gallagher’s thesis is so 
interesting. Gallagher’s question comes back to what we presented as Gallese’s 
“phenomenolologizing” suggestion: we cannot but start from how the world is 
constituted within our own phenomenal appreciation. Are we sure we cannot 
but do that? The issue saw Ernst Schrödinger and Rudolf Carnap on opposite 
sides during the 1930s. Schrödinger was sure that we cannot do otherwise, the 
first-person framework being more basic that the third-person one. For science 
“is always accomplished by scientists who occupy, by necessity, their own first-
person perspective”. Science, bound to leave first-person perspective aside and 
to act as if there were a point of view from nowhere, or as if there were only a 
third-person perspective, depends on a “fundamental axiom” – namely, that 
the world is basically given from first-person perspectives – which cannot be 
scientifically known – for is not empirically testable, nor it is simply a matter of 
convention. So, science depends entirely from a truth not accessible to it!
Carnap opposed this thesis along behaviouristic lines (we can infer that other 
people have minds on the basis of their exterior behaviour). In a way, this 
reproduces exactly a debate between a phenomenologist (was Schrödinger 
aware of Husserl’s argument against some dogmas of empiricism in Philosophie 
als strenge Wissenschaft? (1911) or Ideas I (1913), Section I, Chapter II) – and an 
eliminativist metaphysician of the present time, for example Daniel Dennett.
Where does normativity come in? In a discussion Gallagher introduces about 
some brain imaging experiments designed to study brain areas activated when 
subjects enjoy their own first-person perspectives on some actions they are 
requested to engage in, or observe others engaging in such actions, or just 
imagine to engage in such actions. To make a long story short, the experimental 
design is criticised for neglecting to test another situation, namely that in 
which we imagine ourselves in the place of others. 
Why is focusing this form of social cognition so enlightening? Because it 
identifies a form of social cognition-interaction which is also an origin of pre-
linguistic normativity, or of proto-normativity, so to speak.
While Gallagher’s argument, that we leave to the reader for a pleasant 
discovery, has no need of scholarly references, it is interesting to notice that 
ability to transpose one’s own egocentric coordinates in other’s own (as when 
we give street directions in terms of our interlocutor’s right and left hand, 
for example), being the very condition of an objective space constitution, is 
first made possible by a “motor” activity of actually changing one’s present 
point of view, or just imaging that change: an example par excellence of an 
action-embedded, world-driven, pre-linguistic normativity. We often get this 
transposition wrong – we learn how to do it at about the same age we learn 
to use first person language. But it seems a more fundamental kind of socially 
learned normativity. For without it, we could not regard ourselves as objects – 
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along with the other things and persons – in a common objective space.
And it is most striking that Dennett remark about phenomenology, bound to 
remain a fantasy is turned against him by Gallagher, in the same strict sense 
in which a Cartesian solipsism is a “fantasy” according to Baker: as oblivion 
of a necessary condition for something to be conceivable. A science without 
scientists rooted in the lived space and following the very norms to reach to 
objective space would simply be impossible.
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